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Richards, Kenneth Jackson (M.A., Religious Studies) 
Bodies of Belief: The Problem of Religion in Navajo Nation v. USFS 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Greg Johnson 
In August of 2008, Justice Bea writing the opinion for the 9th Circuit panel in Navajo Nation v. 
USFS explains that although “the district court found the Plaintiffs’ beliefs to be sincere,” the production 
of artificial snow on the San Francisco Peaks does not violate the Indian tribe’s right to religious freedom.  
In a remarkable and controversial justification for this ruling, Justice Bea decides that “the sole effect of 
the artificial snow is on the Plaintiff’s subjective spiritual experience. [...] Nevertheless, a government 
action that decreases the spirituality, the fervor, or the satisfaction with which a believer practices his 
religion is not what Congress has labeled a “substantial burden” ... on the free exercise of religion.”  
Underlying this opinion are profound claims of authority regarding how the body, and bodied movement, 
in this case located between Indigenous ritual practice and snow skiing, are imagined by the court, and in 
the larger sense, through American jurisprudence, as permissible or subject to regulation.  Nested within 
this argument are centuries old paradigms of a civilized and enlightened society as imagined and enforced 
through the European and American colonial projects.   
 I wish to argue through this paper that these colonial projects have always been concerned with 
regulating and conforming the bodies and bodied movements of their subjects.  Furthermore, I wish to 
demonstrate how the court’s understanding of the free exercise of religion represents a particular 
body/mind (practice/belief) ontology that also predominates within the academic study of religion.    By 
rethinking our assumptions about the body’s relationship to religion and the study of religion I wish to 
create a space in which to critically examine the myths constructed in American legal and academic 
discourse regarding religious performativity as constitutive of the lived religious subject
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Introduction 
 
 In 2008, after years of litigation, appeals, district, and federal court decisions the en banc 
panel for the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the production of artificial snow on the San 
Francisco Peaks did not violate the right to the free exercise of religion for several thousand 
Indian people.
1
  The Indian plaintiffs in this case, the Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, the 
Havasupai Tribe, the Hualapai Tribe, the Yavapai-Apache Nation, and the White Mountain 
Apache Nation argued that the use of treated sewage effluent for snow production at a skiing 
resort on Mt. Humphrey’s would desecrate one of their sacred mountains, thus destroying their 
ability to practice their traditional religions. 
   In August of 2008, Justice Carlos Bea, writing for the majority opinion in the 9th Circuit 
en banc panel in Navajo Nation v. USFS, ruled that although “the district court found the 
Plaintiffs’ beliefs to be sincere,” the production of artificial snow on the San Francisco Peaks 
does not violate the Indian tribes’ right to religious freedom.
2
  In a remarkable and controversial 
justification for this ruling, Justice Bea decided that “the sole effect of the artificial snow is on 
the Plaintiff’s subjective spiritual experience ... Nevertheless, a government action that decreases 
                                            
1
 I have chosen to use the term ‘Indian’ to mean all of the people within the United States who identify as 
Indigenous, Native American, American Indian, or First Peoples.  The use of the term ‘Indian’ in American Indian 
scholarship is a reclamation project by American Indians for American Indians.  I use the term in keeping with its 
use in federal Indian law as to maintain a definitional solidarity and continuity between the language of the 
American courts and my own scholarship.  My aim is to communicate clearly to a legal and an American Indian 
audience my overall argument in a fashion that is most accessible for those curious about religious freedom and 
American Indian Indigenous rights.   
 
2
 Navajo Nation et al v. USFS, 535 F.3d (9th Cir. en banc. 2008) at 10041. (under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993.) 
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the spirituality, the fervor, or the satisfaction with which a believer practices his religion is not 
what Congress has labeled a ‘substantial burden’ ... on the free exercise of religion.”
3
  With this 
decision powerful claims were made regarding the nature of religion and the construction and 
protection of religion as a definable legal category.      
 What are the underlying mythologies of the court which enable a decision of this 
magnitude?
4
  Is it possible that the religious claims of the Indian plaintiffs in Navajo Nation are 
fundamentally alien to the court and to how the court understands and defines religion?   
 This thesis explores how the court’s construction and application of the right of religious 
freedom is built upon a particular body ontology.  I define a body ontology as a fundamental 
epistemological frame regarding the nature of being that provides an explanation for what has 
been identified as ‘mind’ and ‘body.’  Body ontologies argue for a particular relationship 
regarding how we explain (or explain away) the existence of a mind and body connection.
5
  The 
body ontology adopted in American law is indebted to an American and European philosophical 
tradition which has inherited the argument that reason, belief, thought, and the mind are separate 
from and independent of our bodies.
6
  As philosophers George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have 
explained, mainstream “western philosophy” has inherited and reinforces a particular body 
                                            
3
 USFS, 535 F.3d at 10041, 10042, emphasis mine. 
 
4
 Following Bruce Lincoln’s understanding of myth as the “small class of stories that possess both credibility and 
authority” we can understand legal mythology as a primary mode of the production and reproduction of credible and 
authoritative stories.  Lincoln further explains “that through the recitation of myth one may effectively mobilize a 
social grouping.  Thus, myth is not just a coding device in which important information is conveyed, on the basis of 
which actors can then construct society.  It is also a discursive act through which actors evoke the sentiments out of 
which society is actively constructed.” Bruce Lincoln, “Myth, Sentiment, and the Construction of Social Forms,” 
Discourse and the construction of society : comparative studies of myth, ritual, and classification. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 24, 25. 
 
5
 Body ontologies, although apparently universal, nonetheless exist in varying modes of possibility dependent upon 
the societies in which they emerge.   
 
6
 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western 
Thought, (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 16.  
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ontology which claims that “human reason is the capacity of the human mind to use transcendent 
reason, or at least a portion of it.  Human reason may be performed by the human brain, but the 
structure of human reason is defined by transcendent reason, independent of human bodies or 
brains. Thus, the structure of human reason is disembodied [and that] human concepts are the 
concepts of transcendent reason. They are therefore defined independent of human brains or 
bodies, and so they too are disembodied.”
7
  The body ontology at work within the legal 
construction of religious freedom is structured in such a way that transcendent reason is always 
posited as disembodied and agentic, where the body moves because the mind tells it to.  
 The United States’ court can only imagine religion in relation to this body ontology.  
When ‘subjective religious experience’ is separated from embodied or physical religious 
exercise, when belief is separated from practice, what emerges is a regulatory onto-definitional 
exercise which is foundational to the court’s construction of religious freedom.  The decision in 
Navajo Nation is part of a greater legal mythology which forces religious bodies into secular 
bodies, which seeks to regulate certain types of religiosity through an unrelenting adherence to a 
body ontology that understands mind and belief to be separate and distinct entities from body 
and movement.  This legal mythology has constantly resulted in the court’s failure to understand 
Indians’ religious lives, even in those cases where the court professes sympathy for them.  In this 
thesis I propose a new reading of the legal regulation of religion in the United States.  I argue 
that through the construction of “legal religion,” haunted by body ontologies and mythic 
imaginings of the secular, an all too familiar politics of religious freedom that seeks to regulate 
religious ‘otherness’ is perpetuated.  Furthermore, this ontology remains persistently present in 
                                            
7
 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy, 21. 
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much of academia, including, and importantly so, the academic study of religion.
8
  Through an 
examination of the body ontology underlying definitions of “free religion,” scholars of religion 
can begin to rethink and question their own employment of a body ontology in their definitions 
of religion.   
 When considering ‘religion’ must we separate belief from practice, mind from ritual?  
The court, I will argue, has a structured habit of doing so and as such is fundamentally incapable 
of understanding or protecting Native American religions.  Similar to what Patricia Penn Hilden 
has suggested, what results is a secular divide that constructs “the location of us and them [and] 
is inculcated early on until dozens of little-questioned assumptions veil both practice and 
theorizing about the quotidian acts of exclusion.”
9
  My aim is to unveil the ‘little-questioned’ 
assumptions regarding the legal definition of religion as constantly perpetuated and arising from 
a body ontology.  My hope is that this critical exercise will contribute to a rethinking of these 
quotidian acts of exclusion inherent in the current juridical employment of religious freedom.   
 This thesis is organized into five sections.  The first section presents the facts and the 
history of Navajo Nation v. USFS  and then locates the court’s body ontology within the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  This section also sets forth a brief history that 
traces the presence and the consistency of a body ontology as it is employed through important 
and infamous Indian Law decisions.  
                                            
8
 Sam Gill explains that “Mind (spirit, soul, intellect) and body are in many ways inseparable despite the ease with 
which our Western religious and intellectual heritage has prepared us routinely to dualize and hierarchize them. Both 
theology and the academic study of religion, indeed the entire academy, tend to ignore the physical body while 
focusing on the mind, yet it must be seen that to focus on the mind remains no less a statement about the body and, 
even though explicitly ignored, our body practices and habits enact our theologies.”  Sam D. Gill, “Embodied 
Theology” in Religious Studies, Theology, and the University: Conflicting Maps, Changing Terrain ed. Linell E. 
Cady, Delwin Brown (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 81. 
 
9
 Patricia Penn Hilden, From a Red Zone: Critical Perspectives on Race, Politics, and Culture. (Trenton: The Red 
Sea Press, Inc., 2006), 160. 
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 The second part of this thesis delves into Hopi arguments for the protection of the San 
Francisco Peaks.  Utilizing testimony from the public record found in local newspapers, 
published community hearings, websites, amicus briefs, and in legal proceedings, I examine how 
different Hopi people represent and construct their religious claims in a court of law.  Whereas 
the legal event gives rise to an articulation of religion, there also exists a measure of an inability 
to translate between cultural paradigms.  This section will explore Hopi articulations of their 
religion as a means for locating an understanding of religion that operates from a different body 
ontology as that of the American courts. 
 The third section proceeds to deconstruct both the majority opinion, written by Justice 
Bea, and the dissent, written by Justice Stevens, in order to specifically understand how a 
specific body ontology is endemically present in the construction of a definition of religion.  This 
section demonstrates that even when different justices disagree as to the nature of religion and 
how it should be protected, there nonetheless persists the American legal body ontology.   
 In the fourth and final section of this thesis I make theoretical conclusions regarding the 
prevalence of the court’s body ontology within the greater secular and colonial project 
underlying the discourses of religious freedom.  I examine how aporatic secular projects are 
haunted and bounded by a body ontology to the extent that the maintenance and perpetuity of 
secularism is contingent upon that ontology. Concluding, I examine the concept of movement 
ontogenesis as a possible alternative for constructing a more adequate and just legal definition of 
free religion. 
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Chapter I 
 Navajo Nation v. USFS 
 
 Navajo Nation v. USFS is a particularly salient example of how the American legal body 
ontology exists as a ground to regulate religious otherness.  The case, once decided and 
certiorari denied, now stands as the enforceable culmination of how religious freedom, as a 
definitional exercise obsessed with regulating bodies and bodied movement, reveals and betrays 
itself for its own regulatory bias.
10
  The American courts are always already biased against 
Indians due to the priority of their body ontology in defining and imagining religion and Indian 
religion. 
 Navajo Nation is a religious freedom case in which the plaintiffs collectively argued that 
the use and production of snow from reclaimed waste water on their most sacred mountain in the 
San Francisco Peaks violates their right to the free exercise of religion under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
11
  Humphrey’s Peak is the tallest of the mountains within the 
San Francisco Peaks and is the site of the Arizona Snowbowl ski resort.  The Snowbowl has been 
in operation since 1938 and is leased by the Arizona Snowbowl resort from the United States 
Forest Service.  The Forest Service, as a branch of the federal government, is bound to manage 
                                            
10
 Certiorari is a formal written order seeking judicial review from the Supreme Court.  Once a case has been 
decided in a Federal District Appellate Court, the United States Supreme Court is the last court in which a case can 
be appealed.  If the Supreme Court denies certiorari it means that they agree with the decision of the lower court and 
the decision stands as law. 
 
11
 When a religious freedom case (RFRA) is brought in front of a court, the plaintiff must first show that she or he 
engages in an “exercise of religion.” Once this has been shown, then it is up to the plaintiff to show that the 
government’s actions (or non-action) has created a “substantial burden” on the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.  Once 
this has been shown, the burden then shifts to the government to prove whether or not the burden is justified through 
a “compelling government interest” and that the government’s actions have been enforced through “the least 
restrictive means.”  The compelling government interest and the least restrictive means tests are known as 
“balancing tests” and are commonly used to decide whether or not a the government can constitutionally restrict 
rights. Navajo Nation et al v. USFS, 535 F.3d (9th Cir. en banc. 2008) at 10040, 10076. 
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the lands in accordance with federal law which mandates that the agency must promote open 
access to multiple-use recreation, must manage the area in accordance to environmental 
regulation, and must allow for the free exercise of religion as outlined under RFRA and the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).   
 The tribes argued that the use of reclaimed sewage effluent to make snow would 
substantially burden their exercise of religion.
12
  As the plaintiff-appellant tribes in this case are 
from diverse Indian tribes with different religious understandings and practices regarding the 
peaks, the types of burdens that were presented varied from tribe to tribe.  Justice Fletcher 
writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2007, summed up the 
collective argument for the tribes as predominantly two types of burdens: first, that the use of 
treated sewage effluent for snow production would create “the inability to perform a particular 
religious ceremony, because the ceremony requires collecting natural resources from the Peaks 
that would be too contaminated - physically, spiritually, or both - for sacramental use; and 
(secondly) the inability to maintain daily and annual religious practices comprising an entire way 
of life; because the practices require belief in the mountain’s purity or spiritual connection to the 
mountain that would be undermined by the contamination.”
13
    
 Navajo Nation is not the first time that some of the tribes have attempted to challenge the 
Forest Service over the desecration of the peaks by snow skiing construction and operations.  In 
Wilson v. Block, in 1983, the Hopi Tribe, an association of Navajo Medicine Men, and two 
nearby ranchers in response to the then-owners’ proposition to expand the ski area brought suit 
                                            
12
 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 479 F.3d at 2855. 
 
13
 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 479 F.3d at 2856. 
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under the first amendment claiming a violation of their free exercise of religion.
14
  The court 
ruled that construction and snow skiing operations did not violate their first amendment right.  
The fact that Indian people have been fighting against the presence of any type of construction 
on the San Francisco Peaks is testament to the unique sacredness in which many Indian people 
hold these peaks.  From the beginning it is apparent that any type of construction on the peaks 
profanes them.   
 In 2002, ASR, the current owners of the Snowbowl, presented the Forest Service with a 
facilities improvement proposal.  The Forest Service, after reviewing the potential environmental 
and cultural impacts of the proposed Snowbowl expansion in 2005, issued a Final Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement and a Record of Decision granting the Snowbowl permission to 
expand the ski area.  This expansion included, among other things, the construction of a new 
high speed lift, the relocation and upgrade of older lifts, the creation of 66 new acres of trails, 
and the use of treated sewage effluent for the production of artificial snow.  Challenging this 
decision by the Forest Service, the plaintiff-appellants brought suit before the district court of 
Arizona in 2006 under a violation of RFRA and NEPA.
15
  Before I examine the 9th Circuit en 
banc reversal of the 9th Circuit decision it is important that I explain the process by which a 
RFRA violation is tested. 
  The process of testing whether or not there has been a substantial burden of religious 
freedom, and whether or not that burden is grounds for a governmental exemption, reveals much 
about how religion is identified and regulated through a particular body ontology.  The process 
itself reveals the jurisprudential definitional construction of religion as regulatory of religious 
                                            
14
 see: Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Circuit, 1983).  
15
 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 907 (D. Ariz. 2006).  NEPA is the National 
Environmental Protection Act, and as this part of the legal argument does not pertain to issues of religious freedom, 
I will not deal with this part of the legal argument in this thesis.   
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bodied otherness.  Through understanding the RFRA test we can better track and deconstruct the 
judicial opinions as they articulate and reveal the American legal body ontology.  
 RFRA was enacted in response to the Supreme Court ruling in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.  The two plaintiffs in Smith, Alfred Smith 
and Galen Black, were Native American members of the Native American Church.  The 
consumption of peyote is a key element in Native American Church ceremony.  As such, their 
use of peyote was an essential part of their religious lives.  They were both fired as counselors in 
a state run substance abuse facility for their religious ingestion of peyote, an illegal 
hallucinogenic cactus.  They were refused unemployment because peyote was a controlled 
substance in Oregon and federal narcotics law.  They challenged the state that their use of peyote 
was religious and not recreational and that this religious use exempted them from government 
regulation.  They argued that the government created a substantial burden on their religious 
practice and did not supply a compelling government interest to substantiate that burden.  They 
argued this under the line of precedent set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.
16
  Smith and Black won in 
the Oregon state courts, but in a controversial Supreme Court ruling, Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, decided that since ‘laws of general applicability’ were not specifically targeted 
towards one or more religious group, and that the state retains a compelling government interest 
in the application of its general laws to the public, then Smith’s burden on religious exercise did 
not exempt them from those laws.  Scalia wrote that “we have never held that any individual’s 
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct 
that the state is free to regulate.”
17
   
                                            
16
 See discussion below. 
 
17
 Winnifred Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 27. 
Richards 
 10 
 Congress found that the ruling in Smith “virtually eliminated the requirement that the 
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral towards religion,” and 
enacted RFRA in response to this finding.
18
  Congress enacted RFRA “to provide a claim or 
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government” and “to 
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free 
exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”
19
   
 RFRA states that the federal government may not “substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as 
provided in subsection (b).”
20
  Congress then undertakes the daunting task of defining what can 
be understood as an exercise of religion.  They wrote that an exercise of religion is “any exercise 
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”
21
  This 
definitional mandate, as Winnifred Sullivan has pointed out, requires the courts, on a hearing by 
hearing basis, to decide what is and is not a religious exercise, based on where they place 
orthodoxy or centrality in systems of religious belief.
22
  The process of deciding what constitutes 
a burden on the free exercise of religion put forward by Congress reveals how the American 
legal body ontology exists always already before the definitional process.  According to the 
                                            
18
 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 479 F.3d at  at 2842.  see Pub. L. No. 103-141, #2(a), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 
(1993). Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,  
418 (2006). 
 
19
 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 479 F.3d at 2842  see Pub. L. No. 103-141, #2(a), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 
(1993). 
 
20 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 479 F.3d at 2842  see Pub. L. No. 103-141, #2(a), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 
(1993). 
 
21
 42 U.S.C.  2000bb-1(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
 
22
 Sullivan, Impossibility, 10, 100. 
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definition, an ‘exercise of religion’ exists in relation to, and is qualified as authentic, based upon 
‘a system of religious belief.’  The exercise, that is, the bodied movement, is of religion.  The 
exercise exists because of religion.  The of understands the body, the vehicle of religious 
movement, as subject to, and sometimes compelled by a transcendental symbolic system of 
something (which the judges end up getting to decide) called ‘religion’.  According to Congress, 
the body moves because of religion.   So already, prior to judicial interpretation, religion and 
exercise are split into different definitional realms of what constitutes the religious, so that 
exercise arises and exists out of and because of religion.  This definitional mandate, this 
enforceable body ontology is expressed and constructed uniquely and powerfully in the Navajo 
Nation en banc ruling where both the majority opinion and the dissent are bound by this 
ontology.  
 Subsection (b) of RFRA builds the compelling interest test for which the government 
may burden a religious exercise.  This section states that the “Government may substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person - (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
23
  RFRA requires that a compelling 
government interest test be applied if the case falls within the precedents set forth in both 
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.   
 Sherbert v. Verner is a case in which a Seventh-day Adventist refused to work on 
Saturday, the day her religion marked as a day of rest, and was subsequently fired from her job.  
Sherbert sought and was denied unemployment compensation through the state of South 
Carolina.  The Supreme Court ruled that the state of South Carolina could not, under the Free 
                                            
23
 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(4) 
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Exercise Clause, deny Sherbert unemployment compensation based on her religious requirement 
to abstain from work on Saturdays.  The court ruled that the state’s requirement for her to choose 
between working on Saturdays and violating her religion’s mandate “force[d] her to choose 
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and 
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”
24
  
Sherbert requires that the government cannot force an individual to choose between following 
the tenets of their religion or receiving a government benefit.    
 In Wisconsin v. Yoder an Amish family in Wisconsin was convicted of violating a state 
law that required children to attend school until the age of 16.  The Amish family argued that the 
attendance of their children in high school was against their religion and way of life.  The 
Supreme Court found that the state law “unduly burdened” their exercise of religion in that it 
“affirmatively compel[led the defendants], under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts 
undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”
25
  Yoder requires the 
government to ask whether or not the government, through its actions or laws, is forcing 
someone to act contrary to their “religious beliefs.”  If the government finds that it is indeed 
forcing someone in this manner, then a compelling government interest must be shown in order 
to continue the enforcement of the particular law in question.   
 These two cases, as set forth by RFRA, set a definitional standard for what may trigger a 
compelling interest test.  Note that in both cases there exists a difference between religious belief 
and religious practice. Both cases recognize that a religious practice is separable and other than a 
religious belief.  In Navajo Nation the extent to which these cases define a ‘substantial burden’ 
                                            
24
 Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 at 399-401. 
 
25
 Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 at 218. 
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was a central argument within the en banc ruling.  As I will explain in section three, the majority 
relies on these two cases to define what constitutes a ‘substantial burden.’   This reliance does 
much to reveal the presence of the American legal body ontology.  What becomes interesting is 
how this particular body ontology perpetuates itself in different mythic productions of legal 
argumentation.  Throughout the course of Navajo Nation, from the district court ruling to the en 
banc hearing, and specifically as explicated through the majority opinion and dissent, even when 
the opinions vary on whether or not the use of treated sewage effluent constitutes a substantial 
burden on the religious practices of the Native plaintiffs, the court’s body ontology remains 
indelibly intact.    
 Robert A. Williams, Jr. has identified a process in which American law has perpetuated 
its own racist attitude towards Native Americans, identifying them consistently as the savage 
other.  He finds that in the long line of federal Indian law cases there exists a consistent racist 
approach that enacts and protects laws which work to remove ‘the Indian,’ as a real and distinct 
cultural and political other from the American cultural and political landscape.
26
  He calls this a 
“racist legal mythology” and argues that “Indians get treated legally by our ‘present day’ justices 
just as Indians were treated by the justices in the nineteenth century: as savages whose rights are 
defined according to a European colonial-era legal doctrine of white racial superiority over the 
entire North American continent.”
27
  The presence of a racist legal mythology throughout federal 
Indian law follows the persistence of the American legal body ontology in that the ‘enlightened’ 
                                            
26
 My examination of an American legal body ontology at work within federal Indian law is inspired by and is a 
continuation of what Williams has identified as a racist legal mythology.  My aim is to trace the racist legal 
mythology to its ontological roots in order to reveal how, as ontology, the American legal body ontology permeates 
federal Indian law and is often the grounds on which racist opinions are made. 
 
27
 Robert A Williams Jr. Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal Story of 
Racism in America. Indigenous Americas., eds. Robert Warrior, Jace Weaver. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005). xxv. 
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and ‘civilized’ mind of the Euro-American imagination is shown to be present only when it 
directs the body in ways associated with the ideals of a civilized human being.  Therefore only 
those practices which fit into the apriori structures of what constitutes civilization are legally 
protected, thus forcing Indian people into a de facto legal status as inferior and savage people.  
The practices and the bodies of the American Indian continue to be regulated, as they were in 
colonial era doctrine, through the American legal body ontology which always already lies 
before the court justices as the ontological grounds from which they perceive the relationship of 
culture, religion, and movement.   
  Williams, building off of the work of legal scholar Robert Cover explains how these 
myths, and I would like to add, ontologies, are constructed and perpetuated through the process 
of “jurisgenesis.”
28
  Jurisgenesis is a concept which explains how laws are always constructed 
within social and cultural narratives and that they therefore are imbued with the tenets and 
principles of those cultural narratives.  As more and more cases contain a racist legal mythology 
and, concurrently, the American legal body ontology, they become strengthened and built as 
foundational.  Through this process the law itself becomes intrinsically linked to the mythologies 
in which it perpetuates thereby setting the American legal body ontology deeper and deeper 
within federal Indian law.   
 American law, although it claims a transcendental authority, is founded on the tenets of 
liberal humanism, tenets such as a-culturalism, tolerance, and the free rational subject.  Peter 
Fitzpatrick explains how “law is imbued with this negative transcendence in its own myth of 
origin where it is imperiously set against certain ‘others’ who concentrate the qualities it 
                                            
28
 Williams, Like a Loaded Weapon, 20. 
 
Richards 
 15 
opposes.”
29
  The transcendental authority of law, law as the force of transcendent reason, is 
constructed against what those imbuing law with its authority imagine as savage society.  
Through jurisgenesis this oppositional logic of savage and civilized becomes repressed behind 
the conceit of the a-cultural, free rational subject.  Much of the history of American law, 
especially federal Indian law is constructed against Indian societies as they are often understood 
as antithetical to American civilization and progress.   
 Navajo Nation v. USFS is part of a larger historical narrative of colonial legal regulation 
and Indigenous resistance that is marked by a colonial obsession with regulating the body and 
bodied movement of its subjects.  As this obsession is present through the course of colonial 
history in North America, I will highlight particularly salient moments in order to demonstrate 
the persistence of this underlying body-ontology of the court.
30
  Beginning with Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s ruling in Johnson v. McIntosh, I will trace the persistent presence of the court’s 
body ontology through the changing currents in federal Indian law.  Following Johnson v. 
McIntosh, I will briefly touch upon the ‘Religious Crimes Code’ then delve more deeply into the 
General Allotment Act.  Upon examination, what begins to appear is a strong connection 
between property or land management and the American legal body ontology.  As sociologist 
Andrea Mubi Brighenti argues, “law is inherently concerned with a relation between bodies and 
their reciprocal movement in space, or, in other words, with a composition of movements [... 
whereas] arguably, the territorial question at the core of law crucially concerns the issue of the 
movement of bodies in space – what could be termed motility – together with the ways in which 
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movement shapes and articulates social relations.”
31
  Federal Indian law was, and is primarily 
concerned with regulating Indian bodies in such was as to secure colonial supremacy.  This 
process has resulted in a history of Indian genocide, land theft, and cultural destruction.  Navajo 
Nation is not only about religious freedom, but is deeply concerned with the management or the 
protection of religious freedom on public land.  Navajo Nation concerns the management and the 
regulation of Indian bodies on public land.   
 This brief historical trajectory culminates with Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association.  Not only is this case heavily cited in Navajo Nation, but concerns both 
the management of public lands and a religious freedom argument.  The point of this brief 
history is to demonstrate that the decision in Navajo Nation does not stand alone as a singularity 
within federal Indian law and religious freedom cases.  Instead, Navajo Nation is the most 
contemporary manifestation of this body ontology as employed in the construction of legally 
protected religion.   
 One of the landmark cases in federal Indian law is Johnson v. McIntosh, decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in 1823.  This case currently stands as the legal foundation 
for all land ownership rights in the United States and, as Walter Echohawk has noted, “with the 
stroke of a pen” all Indian land rights were ceded to the United States government.
32
   Johnson v. 
McIntosh concerns the validity of Indian land transfers made before the U.S. Revolution.  At 
issue was whether or not a land title given by the government, or a land title issued from an 
Indian tribe was valid.  Chief Justice John Marshall ruling for the Supreme Court, relying on the 
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‘Doctrine of Discovery’
33
 wrote “that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian 
title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree of 
sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.”
34
  Although this 
case was primarily concerned with justifying colonial land title over Indian occupation, Justice 
Marshall’s legal justification for this decision relied heavily on racist and assimilationist 
perspectives which understood the practices of land tenure and property cultivation to be the 
mark of a civilized and civilizing society.  This line of argument and colonial epistemology 
paved the way for the displacement and land theft of millions of Indian people.  The very notion 
of property as established through the colonization of North America is itself a type of 
appropriate exercise describing legitimate types of movement upon the landscape.  This 
construction of property is built upon ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘civilization’ as opposed to the 
“fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the 
forest” so popular within the colonial discourse of the time.
35
  By defining the Indian peoples as 
savages the colonial government, in the name of civilization, acted to remove the Indian people 
from their lands and separate them from their traditional modes of subsistence and political 
economy.  
 What was first articulated in Johnson v. McIntosh becomes the jurisprudential standard 
for regulating the bodies and bodied movement of Indians through the enforcement of Euro-
American property law as well as federal laws on public land.  Navajo Nation is a case 
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concerned with the regulation, or the enforcement, of a certain type of bodied movement on 
public land.  As I explain later, the secular management of the Peaks has a large impact on the 
ability for many Hopi people to exercise their religion.  In Navajo Nation the court is deciding, as 
it did in Johnson, that the type of bodied movement of the Indians is secondary to, and subject to 
a form of ‘civilized’ bodied movement, exemplified in Johnson through European agricultural 
land cultivation, and exemplified in Navajo Nation through the leisure activity of snow-skiing.   
And in keeping with the body ontology of the contemporary court, the argument that a civilized 
body gives the right of conquest over uncivilized bodies remains the ground for which the 
decision in Navajo Nation was handed down.  What emerges from this type of reading is a trans-
temporal connection for the American legal body ontology prevalent in both Johnson v. 
McIntosh and Navajo Nation v. USFS. 
 Spurred politically by the motivation and increasing presence of Protestant missions in 
Indian country, as well as by the increasing settler population, the lure of mining, and the push 
for land development, the federal government adopted an assimilationist policy towards Indian 
peoples.   By the late 19th century and well into the 20th century, federal Indian policy revolved 
almost completely around an effort to dissolve Indians into the dominant cultural milieu of 
American democratic society.
36
  Many of the protestant missionaries during that time believed 
that the Indians’ means of subsistence and land tenure practices kept them from becoming 
civilized Christian members of a growing American society.
37
  Furthermore, missionaries and 
assimilationists believed that the religious dances and practices of the Indian peoples, 
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particularly those of the plains peoples (which was primarily focused on the Sun Dance) was, as 
explained by historian of religions, Tisa Wenger, seen as “a violent and bloody display of Indian 
savagery [... which] prevented the Indians from adopting the concept of private property or any 
meaningful work ethic.”
38
  Many of the settlers in the great plains during this time period were 
already predetermined to see this ceremony as ‘savage’ and ‘bloody’ based upon their own ideals 
of what constituted civilized religious behavior.  The piercing and dancing involved in a Sun 
Dance fit well into the already formed notions of the ‘savage’ in the colonial imagination of 
those settlers who were witness to those ceremonies.  This is especially the case for those 
missionaries who came to the great plains region for the sole purpose of converting those Indian 
peoples who practiced the Sun Dance.   
 First developed in 1883 the “Religious Crimes Code” was passed specifically to target 
Indian religious ceremonies, including the Sun Dance, and gave government agents the 
authorization to use force and imprisonment to stop any Indian religious practice that they 
thought to be immoral, subversive, or counter to the assimilationist projects of the federal 
government.
39
  The Religious Crimes Code is a clear example of how Indian culture is regulated 
and silenced through a direct enforcement and regulation of Indian bodies.  The American legal 
body ontology is also present with the belief that if the colonial legal powers can regulate Indian 
bodies they can regulate Indian identity, religion, and society. 
 Assimilationist policy was a regulatory action specifically aimed at ending and altering 
the bodies and bodied movement of American Indians through the insistence that the civilized 
citizen was an industrious citizen, believing that the civilized citizen acted and comported their 
bodies in culturally specific ways.  By forcing a certain type of movement, of cultural and 
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religious exercise, the missionaries and assimilationists believed that they could civilize and 
remove the ‘savagery’ of Indian culture from the Indians.  Within assimilationist policies we find 
the American legal body ontology in its jurisgenesis.  Once again, culture, religion, Indian-ness, 
and identity itself, is something separate from the body, which the body (and here understood in 
an extremely causal relationship) enacts, performs, and marks as the signifier of the degree of 
civilization.  The Religious Crimes Code was a powerful piece of legislation aimed specifically 
at the regulation of religious exercise on reservations and is a strong example of the American 
legal body ontology was at work in the service of certain colonial goals.    
Peter Nabokov explains that “the usurpation of American Indian lands was accomplished 
by an assault on their religious and emotional ties to place.”
40
  The General Allotment Act was 
one such effort to sever Indian connections and emotional ties to place.  The General Allotment 
Act was signed by President Cleveland on February 8, 1887.  Under the Act, the Indian land base 
was chopped up into individual parcels of private property, effectively dissolving many 
reservations as well as Indian governance over their own lands.  Although the Act, on its surface, 
was intended to force Indian people to participate in the private property system of land 
cultivation and capitalist production, significant portions of the land were allotted to non-Indian 
people.
41
  The purpose of the Act was not limited to the assimilation of Indian peoples.  Over 90 
million acres were taken from Indian tribes and allotted to non-Indian settlers or was possessed 
by the government.  The General Allotment Act was as much about forcing Indian people into 
Euro-American forms of property tenure and cultivation as it was about the legal theft of 
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millions of acres of land.  Over the course of its tenure in federal Indian law, only 41 million 
acres of former tribal lands were allotted to Indian people.
42
  Arising from the American legal 
body ontology stems the understanding that property, like the body, is to be ruled by the civilized 
mind.  This form of property management, which is essentially the management of certain 
culturally approvable forms of bodied movement on a landscape, operates under a model of 
sedentary agriculturalism and strictly defined private property boundaries.  Forms of subsistence 
practiced by diverse Indian peoples such as farming a commons, nomadic hunting and gathering, 
or seasonal horticulturalism defied the progress of colonization and therefore, under a colonial 
logic, allowed the colonists to grant themselves the right to the seizure of Indian lands.  The 
results of this act were extensive in the dismemberment of the Indian land base and had a 
powerfully destructive effect on the sustained continuity of many Indian tribes.  In 1934, giving a 
history of the General Allotment Act before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, Delos 
Sacket Otis explained that the “supreme aim [was to] substitute white civilization for [the 
Indian’s] tribal culture.”
43
 A B.I.A. agent for the Yankton Sioux argued that the purpose of the 
Act was based on the belief that “as long as Indians live in villages they will retain many of their 
old and injurious habits.  Frequent feasts, community in food, heathen ceremonies, and dances, 
constant visiting - these will continue as long as the people live together in close neighborhoods 
and villages ... I trust that before another year is ended they will generally be located upon 
individual lands [or] farms. From that date will begin their real and permanent progress.”
44
  By 
forcing a particular type of bodied movement upon a landscape, the federal action of the General 
Allotment Act sought to remove the Indian, as a disembodied concept of savagery, from the 
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North American populace.  Considering the American legal body ontology as a way for 
understanding the General Allotment Act, the assimilationists wished to de-racialize the bodies 
of Indian peoples in order to merge their identities with the then budding concept of the 
American citizen.  This rationale is subject when the very model for the civilized human being is 
the white male body of the Euro-American colonist.  Summing up the philosophy of the General 
Allotment Act, Walter Echo-Hawk argues that the Act operated on the idea that “Indians could 
not become assimilated into society as useful citizens, it seems, while still in a tribal state, and 
their communally owned tribal land was seen as an obstacle to the government’s civilization 
efforts [...] The allotment and sale process would benefit Indians, according to policy makers, by 
stamping out tribalism and savagery so the red race could be absorbed into mainstream 
society.”
45
  Does this force of assimilation imply a transformation of ‘redness’ to ‘whiteness,’ or 
does the assimilation argument amount to a force of racial power in which a particular ethnic 
group is isolated to a place of servitude in labor in which, regardless of the degree of their 
assimilation, remain held due to the physical characteristics of their bodies?   
 What should now be present to the reader is a rather overt obsession with the regulation 
of Indian bodies and bodied movement through the enforcement of particular epistemologies of 
property and boundary maintenance.  On one hand there is the direct regulation of Indian 
religiosity as enforced through the Religious Crimes Code, and on the other there is the massive 
and wide reaching effect of the regulation of Indian movement (and following with the American 
legal body ontology) as a means for destroying Indian culture.  Although, as we shall see, the 
language of the decision in Navajo Nation is not as explicit in its attempt to regulate Indian 
culture and bodied movement, the effects and the processes are remarkably similar.  Albeit 
                                            
45
 Echo-Hawk, In The Courts, 162. 
Richards 
 23 
seemingly indirect, the enforcement of certain permissible and federally recognized types of 
religious and secular exercise on the San Francisco Peaks is decided through the boundary 
maintenance and property law investments of secular public space. 
 In 1988 the Supreme Court handed down the decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Association.  This case lies importantly within this brief history of the 
regulation of Native American religion within the United States’ legal system because in many 
ways it is a powerful coagulation of the myths of colonial domination.  Although there is a 
hundred year gap between the General Allotment Act and Lyng, the racist legal mythology and 
the American legal body ontology had become naturalized within the legal decisions and 
discourses of federal Indian law.  The American legal body ontology as always already present 
had been nested deep enough within federal Indian legal epistemologies as to maintain its form 
as ontological ground and colonial force.  By the time of Lyng, not only had the language of 
savagery been firmly embedded within federal Indian law, but also had the American legal body 
ontology become a powerful tool to be wielded as colonial power.   
 Lyng is a landmark case that expresses the American legal body ontology, regulates 
religious otherness through the reliance of this ontology and the maintenance of public lands, and 
is a powerful example for the abject misunderstanding and inability for cross-cultural translation 
within the highest court of the American legal system.  Furthermore, and of central significance 
to this thesis, Justice Bea writing for the majority in Navajo Nation cites heavily from Lyng in 
the justification for his ruling.
46
     
 Ten years prior to the Supreme Court decision in Lyng, in response to an interest by the 
agency to upgrade a road to assist with timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area in the 
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national forest, the U.S. Forest Service commissioned an in depth study of the Native American 
cultural and religious sites in the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation and the Six Rivers National 
Forest in Northern California.  The report commissioned by the Forest Service is called the 
Theodoratus Report.  Through intensive research in local archaeological sites and records, as 
well as ethnographic and community based information gathering among the local tribal elders, 
the report found that any action by the Forest Service would have a destructive impact upon the 
archaeological remains belonging to the local Native communities as well as cause irreversible 
religious desecration for those communities and peoples.
47
  According to the report, “research 
indicates that there is a direct relationship between active Forest Service involvement with these 
sites and the degrading of Native American religious life in these mountains. We urge the Forest 
Service not to take action to try to improve these sites and trails.”
48
  The Theodoratus Report, in 
sum, strongly recommended against any proposed development of the area.   
 This area is known locally by the different tribes as the ‘High Country’ and is considered 
an incredibly important sacred area.  For the Tolowa, Yurok, Karok, and Hupa tribes the High 
Country is the spiritual center of the world and as such is central to their religion, cultural 
perpetuity, and tribal identity.
49
  The tribal plaintiffs organized as the Northwestern Indian 
Cemetery Protective Association and challenged that the proposed developments violated their 
First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion.   
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 Regardless, in 1982 the Forest Service went forward with its plan to build the road and 
harvest more than 700 million board feet of timber from the area.
50
  Following this action the 
tribes sued and won in both the District Court and in the 9th Circuit, which found that the 
proposed action did violate the tribes’ First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.  
The Supreme Court reversed these decisions and found that “even if we assume that we should 
accept the Ninth Circuit’s prediction, according to which the G-O road will ‘virtually destroy the 
... Indians’ ability to practice their religion,’ ... the Constitution simply does not provide a 
principle that could justify upholding respondents’ legal claims.  However much we might wish 
that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every 
citizen's religious needs and desires.”
51
  In this case the court takes the slippery slope argument 
as reasoning for denying the Indian plaintiffs their religious freedom claim.  Furthermore, in 
keeping with the American legal body ontology, religion and religious practice is something 
separate from the idea of the individual and can therefore be destroyed without fundamentally 
doing any violence to the individual.  
 Much of the same reasoning and line of argumentation used in the Lyng decision was also 
incorporated into the Navajo Nation decision.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor writing for the 
majority in Lyng distinguishes between ‘destroy’ and ‘prohibit,’ writing that the government can 
neither coerce or penalize people for acting in ways central to their religious beliefs.  She 
clarifies that the key word in the free exercise clause is ‘prohibit,’ and is “written in terms of 
what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact 
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from the government.”
52
  Furthermore, she argued that if the Indian plaintiffs could claim a First 
Amendment burden it would impinge upon the government’s property rights.  The religious 
freedom rights, she writes, “do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its 
land.”
53
  What lies within both cases is a strong, yet subtly implicit presence of the American 
legal body ontology within the continued construction of religious freedom in American 
constitutional law.  As I have already demonstrated in this paper, the legal justification for the 
regulation and maintenance of public lands is most directly concerned with the enforcement of 
certain privileged and idealized bodies and bodied movement upon that landscape.   
 The Lyng decision is a mine for the raw materials of religious exercise and its regulation 
through a body ontology that becomes more clearly refined in the Navajo Nation decision.  Both 
cases have in common the regulation and maintenance of public property as idealized secular 
space, a space in which as Justice O’Connor clearly stipulates, and Justice Bea builds upon, is 
valued for its capitalist raw material benefit, for its ownership by an entity, through a 
governmentality that is explicitly secular.  There also exists a language of coercion by which the 
government grants an individual the right to choose to practice their religion, even if that means 
they can choose to practice a religion that is being destroyed.  Remember, the freedom of the 
individual is in her or his ability to freely choose to believe and therefore choose to practice 
whatever culture or religion they want.  The freedom lies in the individual’s ability as a rational 
a-cultural subject, not in the individual’s commitment or involvement within a community or a 
particular cultural predilection.  The body is subject and secondary to the transcendental and 
agentic individual who chooses to believe and subsequently chooses to embody their religion.   
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 In an almost oracular pronouncement, the Theodoratus Report attempts to explain the 
inability of the court, and in a sense, the inability of the greater American cultural milieu, to 
define and locate the ‘religious’ as highly problematic when trying to understand how the 
desecration of Native American sacred space affects Indians’ free exercise of religion.   
the most important aspect of the present study has been the examination of those beliefs and 
practices which must be subsumed, although inadequately, under the discrete 
classification of “religion.”  The “religious” aspect of the lives of Native Americans can 
be only roughly categorized into separate considerations.  Because of the particular 
nature of the Indian perceptual experience, as opposed to the particular nature of the 
predominant non-Indian, Western perceptual experience, any division into “religious” or 
“sacred” is in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian 
“categories,” and distorts the original conceptualization of the process ...
54
   
The premise for the court’s distortion of Indian religion lies in the primacy of the American legal  
body ontology.  The fundamental inability to translate the relationship of Indian religious 
practices to their use and conceptualization of sacred space is repeatedly denied the definitional 
and jurisprudential viability as a constitutionally protected religious exercise. 
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Chapter II 
 From a Hopi Center: Body Ontology and the Question of Religion 
 
 In 1982, speaking during a panel discussion at the University of Northern Arizona on the 
development of the San Francisco Peaks, Hopi tribal member Stan Honanie describes the effects 
of the Snow Bowl developments as “sacreligious [sic] behavior on the part of the dominant 
society.”
55
 He goes on further to explain, “[a] handful of religious leaders coming to the Peaks to 
gather evergreens for their ceremonies or to pray to the mountains, does not outweigh, in the 
public mind, the 3000 people per day that are going to use the facilities.  Hopi religious leaders 
will be weakened in their efforts to be humble and religious.  The development distorts the 
religion of the Hopi people.  Forced discussion of the issue further dilutes our religion. [...] Our 
culture and our ways are dying.”
56
 According to certain Hopi people, the use of recycled waste 
water for snow production pollutes their religion, cosmology, and way of life.  The sacrilegious 
behavior of the federal government and the Arizona Snowbowl company is powerful enough to 
destroy their way of life. 
 My goal here is not to describe or define a Hopi ontology.  I do not want to give the 
illusion of a monolithic, timeless Hopi way of understanding the world.  My goal here is to point 
to Hopi difference as enunciated through Hopi testimony.  I agree with scholar Homi K. Babha 
who has explained how “the question of the representation of difference is therefore always also 
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a problem of authority.”
57
  With materials that the Hopi people have presented through the public 
media and through the court proceedings in Navajo Nation, my goal is to decenter my own 
authoritative position in order to locate Hopi narratives that constitute the ‘otherness’ that the 
court so continuously fails to comprehend.  Hopi legal and media testimony constitute the 
majority of the material that I will analyze in trying to understand and locate the importance of 
the San Francisco Peaks within Hopi tradition.  I will use anthropological and historical sources 
to contextualize the Hopi testimonies. 
 The Hopi argument for the protection of the San Francisco Peaks comes out of a zone of 
vast difference from that of the American courts and legislative constructions of ‘free’ religion.    
In the case of Navajo Nation v. USFS Hopi religion is produced and constituted through the legal 
testimonies and public statements given by Hopi people.  Greg Johnson explains, “Native 
Americans’ use of legal and academic categories is quite real and consequential, signaling one of 
the central ways native peoples emerge from their engagements with modernity to appear, 
paradoxically, more like their ‘traditional’ selves.  In other words, through acts of legal 
representation, native witnesses engage in a creative (even procreative) process.”
58
  How 
different Hopi people argue for the protection of the San Francisco Peaks constitutes authentic 
religious language in that during the moment of their explication and defense for their sacred 
places they present to the public, although sparingly, those aspects of their religious lives that 
constitute them as religious.    
 For many Hopi, the use of recycled sewage effluent for snow production on the Peaks not 
only pollutes the mountains, but pollutes all aspects of Hopi life.  Wayne Taylor, a previous Hopi 
tribal chairman, wrote an article in AZCentral News explaining that the production of snow from 
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recycled waste water will have devastating effects for the Hopi people.  He cites Majol Honanie, 
a young initiate into the Katsina Society.  Majol explains, “when the Katsinas come to our 
villages, we say our prayers to them and they carry them to the Peaks ... This is what I have been 
taught and this is what I respect today.  Snowmaking will pollute the land and water and will 
affect the birds, animals and people.  The Katsinam may abandon their home.  Our clan roles will 
vanish.  So, too, will our way of life.”
59
 This type of pollution infects Hopi tradition and ritual 
practice to the point where their rituals become ineffectual, and their traditions destroyed.    
 Water is central to Hopi life.  In the arid region of the Hopi mesas life depends upon the 
presence of water; for drinking, crop irrigation, and ritual action.  The Hopi people have 
historically been dependent upon rainfall for the irrigation of their crops and for the 
replenishment of their drinking supplies.
60
   Rain, spring water, mist, these different forms of 
water are called paahu and refer to ‘wild water,’ or ‘water found in nature.’
61
 Paahu is associated 
with the presence of the Katsina and is believed to possess life giving and life sustaining 
qualities.
62
  Furthermore, ritual efficacy and Katsina well being is dependent upon the ‘purity’ of 
paahu. 
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 The Katsina are deity like spiritual beings which are either ancestors, heroic ancestors, or 
certain deific entities which exist as a part of Hopi cosmology and mythology.  At death the 
hi’ksi, (the breath-body) leaves the body and transforms into a cloud, as a Katsina.  The rain and 
clouds are considered to be the actual presence of the Katsina spirits who are both ancestors and 
deities.  It is believed that the Katsina are responsible for bringing or holding back rainfall each 
year.  This in turn depends upon the correct comportment and execution of ritual activity as well 
as an unpolluted San Francisco Peaks.  The maintenance of Hopi tradition ensures that the 
Katsina will continue to bring rain and the Hopi way of life will continue.   
 Ritual efficacy is not the only thing at stake here.  The ways in which elements in Hopi 
life are interconnected mean that the cultural identity, the very life-ways of the Hopi are 
disrupted.  In Hopi cosmology the world is divided into halves; the world of the above in which 
humans dwell, work, and live and the world of the below where the Katsinam dwell, work, and 
live.  It is believed that the two worlds are mirror opposites of each other, so that when one 
ceremony is going on in the above world, the exact opposite ceremony (in the calendrical ritual 
cycle) is taking place in the other world.
63
  In this cosmology the Katsinam enter into the upper 
world in two different ways.  They will either come as clouds or rain in order to revitalize the 
Hopi people or they will appear in the forms of the Katsina Society dancers during the many 
ritual dances that take place throughout the ritual calendar year.  The Katsinam are persuaded to 
come only if the Hopi people are correctly performing their ceremonies and living in ways 
prescribed by their traditions.
64
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 Nuvatukya’ovi is the Hopi name for the San Francisco Peaks and roughly translates to 
‘snow-capped peaks,’ and is believed to be one of the homes of the Katsina.
65
  During a press 
conference at the Flagstaff City Hall in early February of 2004, Hopi vice chairman Caleb 
Johnson said, “the Hopi people believe the Katsinas live on the sacred mountain.”
66
  Wayne 
Taylor explained, “Nuvatukya’ovi is central to Hopi culture and religion.  It is the home of the 
Katsina spirits who, in the growing season, drift as clouds from the Peaks and descend on my 
homeland, bringing rain, hope, and guidance to the Hopi people.”
67
  The San Francisco Peaks are 
simultaneously the home of the Katsina and the location from which rain storms originate.  The 
purity of the peaks is paramount to the coming of rain.  If the peaks are covered with polluted 
water, then that water not only affects the Katsina spirits, but also is seen to pollute the rain, and 
disrupt the cyclical and causal nature of the Hopi world.   
 For the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Navajo Nation, Hopi member and director of the 
tribe’s Cultural Preservation Office Leigh Kuwanwisiwma testified in defense of the Peaks 
claiming that the mountains needed to remain pure from pollutants: 
The purity of the spirits, as best we can acknowledge the spiritual domain, we feel were 
content in receiving the Hopi clans.  So when you begin to intrude on that in a manner 
that is really disrespectful to the Peaks and to the spiritual home of the Katsina, it affects 
the Hopi people.
68
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The importance of the purity of the Peaks can be understood in relation to the overall effect of 
the pollution caused by the use of treated sewage effluent.  If the Peaks are polluted, then 
everything becomes polluted, and as Hopi member Antone Honanie testified in Navajo Nation, 
the ceremonies become “simply ... a performance for performance sake.”
69
  This form of 
pollution is both environmental and cosmological.  Environmentally, the treated sewage effluent 
contains trace amount of fecal coliform bacteria, organic pollutants, viruses, and protozoa such 
as Giardia.
70
  Although present in only small amounts per gallon, when up to 1.5 million gallons 
of treated water is sprayed per day over a large part of the mountain, the presence of pollution is 
indisputable.  For the Hopi people, the spreading of feces and human waste on the home of the 
Katsinam is cosmologically a very dangerous act.  For many Hopi, the type of pollution that 
comes from recycled waste water is of a religious nature and is not removable by technology.
71
  
That is, machines and chemical processes are not sufficient for water purification, only through 
ritual is the water able to be properly cleaned.  
 The spraying of treated sewage effluent on the ‘home’ of the Katsinas is a pollutive 
action of a cosmological order.  Cosmological pollution, as Mary Douglas has suggested, “is the 
by product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves 
rejecting inappropriate elements.”
72
  According to Douglas, pollution is “that which must not be 
included if a pattern is to be maintained.”
73
 The use of treated sewage effluent for snow 
production on a cosmologically important mountain is a violence upon the ordering of Hopi 
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culture.  This violence disrupts ritual ordering so that the moving body and the structure of the 
cosmos experience a break in the process of meaning making and cultural becoming.   This break 
disrupts the ritual as making experience.  Unlike secular space which is separate from acting 
bodies, Hopi space and Hopi people are interconnected and dependent upon each other.  When 
the court decides that the use of recycled waste water for snow production does not create an 
objectively substantial burden for the Hopi people’s free exercise of religion, they unfairly, and 
inappropriately apply a secular logic to a case which operates under drastically different 
paradigms. 
 How is it that the desecration of a sacred place, a place in which very few Hopi people 
actually ceremonially attend, can disrupt and potentially destroy their way of life?  The 
understanding of place adopted by the court absolutizes geography as “a condition in which 
space exists independently of any object(s) or relations: space is a discrete and autonomous 
container.”
74
  This model of absolutized space is foundational for the modern hegemonic 
understanding of property which, in line with Sam Gill’s interpretation of territory, “tends to be 
considered as objectified and impersonal.”
75
  The concept of space or property as an objective 
container which is inhabited, alienated, built with or on, and engendered is a space that is 
objectively separate and present in its relation to human actors.  As Gill has explained, “many of 
the limitations on the present conceptions of territory stem from the Western style of separating 
mind and body that elevates the mind over the body.”
76
  The Peaks lie within the boundaries of a 
National Forest and as such they are legally constructed as secular space.  Within the 
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construction of secular space as an objectified and impersonal territory we once again find the 
American legal body ontology at work.  Secular space, like the body, is understood to be 
separate from the human actors who engendered it with meaning and structure.  In other words, 
the self does not need a particular place to maintain its identity.    
 A Hopi conception of space differs greatly from these notions of American secularism.  
To address this issue I want to look to the Nima’n, which is the last and the greatest of the all day 
Katsina dances in the Hopi ritual calendar.  The Nima’n, or ‘Home-going dance,’ takes place in 
late July and serves the purpose of sending the Katsina back to their homes in the San Francisco 
Peaks and elsewhere.
77
  The Katsina are sent home so that they may come back as rain during the 
planting season.  Nuvatukya’ovi is intimately a place of presence, in that it is constantly 
described as a home for the Katsina.  As the home for the Katsina who are both spiritual entities 
and deceased ancestors, Nuvatukya’ovi is both a real and intensely present geographical entity, 
while also being the cosmological location for the afterlife and the fifth world of emergence.   
 During the Nima’n, Hopi dancers wear masks, body paint, and elaborate costumes and 
perform as the Katsina.  This is not an allegorical identity play.  When the Hopi dancer puts on 
the mask and dances as a Katsina, he becomes the Katsina.
78
  At this point subjective and 
objective are collapsed.  The belief of the Katsina is not objectified through dance, instead the 
Katsina is corporeal as a lived and moved identity born through the experience of the dancer.  
Gill understands this as a process of dancing as making.  “Dancing,” he writes, “is distinguished 
by the relationship between the maker and the thing made.  The dancer, in dancing, makes the 
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dance.  The dance is inseparable, physically inseparable from the body of the dancer, from the 
body of the maker of the dance ... so the dance is other than the dance while being identical with 
the dancer ... yet the dancing body presents a fascinating new wrinkle: there is no physical 
separation between the two parts, dance and dancer, these are identical bodies.”
79
  In the moment 
of the Nima’n, the Hopi dancer is Katsina, his home is the San Francisco Peaks which he sees off 
in the distance.  The Hopi community in attendance sees Katsina dancing while also seeing their 
family members, friends, and tribal members.  Just as the Katsina as sign is collapsed into the 
movement of the dancer, so too are the Peaks as sign collapsed into the real and constitutive 
space of Hopi geography.  The sign is not separate from the signifier.  Dancing as making 
removes this divide which is the constant mark of a body ontology.  Sam Gill elucidates, 
“dancing creates artifact, that is, what is created and experienced as other is not a real other, but 
the signs of the other, even an ideal other.  Yet, this artifactual construct is bodily experienced, 
thus having the kind of presence that distinguishes the real.”
80
  Ritual action contains this 
element of reflexivity where the ideal other, in this case the Katsina, and by extension the Peaks, 
becomes of the body.  In this reading, religion is not something that is experienced, it is the 
experience.  A court that constructs religion upon a body ontology will always separate Hopi 
belief from Hopi practice and will allow space for the regulation of Hopi religion.   
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Chapter III 
The Court’s Body Ontology and the Construction of a Definition of Religion 
 
 In the en banc hearing for Navajo Nation v. USFS, the majority found that the production 
of artificial snow on the San Francisco Peaks did not violate the Indian tribes’ right to the free 
exercise of religion.
81
  Navajo Nation v. USFS currently stands as law in the United States.  
Navajo Nation is representative of a particular American and colonial mythology regarding the 
nature of religion and the role of the individual within and apart from that understanding of 
religion.  This understanding of religion is perpetuated through what Fitzpatrick has labeled as 
the ‘mythology of modern law.’
82
  This mythology is constructed around and by a particular 
body ontology which seeks to separate belief from practice, thought from movement, identity 
from body.    
 What is truly remarkable about this case is the almost complete inability of the justices to 
effectively translate Hopi religious claims into a legal and jurisprudential understanding of 
religion.  Both the majority and the dissent failed to acknowledge Hopi religion.  Whether or not 
members of the court were for or against a RFRA claim, both sides constructed and perceived 
Hopi religion in terms of their own definitional frameworks.  This, on its own, is not that 
irregular in colonial law.  What this massive mistranslation reveals is not merely the resiliency of 
power, but also the underlying and persistent American legal body ontology employed for the 
purpose of power and its resistance.  The court has yet to imagine Hopi religion outside of its 
own mythologies and body ontologies. 
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 I am going to analyze the court’s mythology of religion and its body ontology through a 
textual analysis of the majority’s opinion, written by Justice Bea; and the dissent, written by 
Justice Fletcher, joined by Justice Pregerson and Justice Fisher.  The majority opinion expresses 
a mythology which radically locates and splits belief from practice; in doing so they isolate 
religion as a definable attribute or ‘perspective’ of the individual.  This mythology is situated 
firmly within the Enlightenment project and, concurrently, within certain tendencies of American 
liberalism in that the religious is consistently defined in relation to and subject to the rational and 
secular individual.   
 The dissent expresses a mythology which understands the body and religious bodied 
movement as an expression, or an enactment of religious belief.  The dissent’s utilization of the 
court’s body ontology departs from the majority’s in interesting and challenging ways.  Justice 
Steven’s conception of religion resembles, in some respect, how Judith Butler understands 
speech act theory and performativity.  In what follows, I will first analyze the majority opinion 
with an eye to how it reveals and perpetuates the American legal body ontology, and second, I 
will analyze the dissent under the lens of Butlerian performativity.   
 In order to understand the weight and the mythological tenacity behind Justice Bea’s 
exclamation that “the sole effect of the artificial snow is on the Plaintiff’s subjective spiritual 
experience,” we must attempt to locate the definitional process in which Justice Bea argues his 
ruling.  It is in the construction of a definition of religion that the court perpetuates and enforces 
the body ontology nested within its own mythology of religion.  What exactly is “subjective 
spiritual experience” and how is this perceived by the majority to be different, or at least 
‘substantially’ different, from an exercise of religion?   
Richards 
 39 
 Judge Bea upholds the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs’ beliefs are “sincere.”  
Following the correct legal protocol to ascertain if there has been a RFRA violation, Judge Bea 
then looks to see whether or not the “sincere” beliefs of the tribes have been substantially 
burdened.  Since Justice Bea found that the use of treated sewage effluent for snow production 
on Humphrey’s Peak does not constitute a substantial burden, the line of inquiry ended there.  
For the majority, the sincerity, or the authenticity of the Plaintiffs’ beliefs were not an issue. A 
primary concern for the majority was whether or not the sincere and authentic religious beliefs of 
the Indians were being burdened by a government action.   
 The definition of religion put forth by RFRA, that a religious exercise is “any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,” can be 
interpreted to be overly vague and inclusive to the point of inapplicability. 
83
  As Justice Bea 
explained, if every sincere religious belief could be burdened by the government, based solely 
upon the effect of the government action upon their ability to exercise religion, then “each citizen 
would hold an individual veto to prohibit the government action solely because it offends their 
religious beliefs, sensibilities, tastes, or fails to satisfy his religious desires.”
84
  In other words, 
Justice Bea found the definition set forth by Congress to be inclusive and vague enough to satisfy 
any claim to religiosity and therefore could potentially grant any citizen the ability to challenge a 
governmental action.  This is a slippery slope argument, one in which Justice Bea attempts to 
resolve through a redefining of religious practice and of what constitutes a “substantial burden” 
on religion.  With the construction of what constitutes a “substantial burden,” Justice Bea defines 
what is religious enough, that is, what counts as free religion and what does not.  His reading of 
RFRA  pulls forth and enacts the latent but ever present body ontology within the myth of an 
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“exercise of religion.”  In similar ways to the Religious Crimes Code, Justice Bea is regulating 
Indian religions because they do not coincide with the court’s notion of civilized or ‘free’ 
religion as imagined in our modern secular courts.   
 Judge Bea grounds his definition of what constitutes a substantial burden in Yoder and 
Sherbert, the Supreme Court cases set out in RFRA.  He explains that “the presence of recycled 
wastewater on the Peaks does not coerce the Plaintiffs to act contrary to their religious beliefs 
under the threat of sanctions, nor does it condition a governmental benefit upon conduct that 
would violate their religious beliefs, as required to establish a ‘substantial burden’ on religious 
exercise under RFRA.”
85
  Following Yoder, Bea argues that the government must coerce 
someone in order for there to be a substantial burden, and following Sherbert, Bea argues that the 
government must supply or withhold a benefit for there also to be a violation.  Bea argues that 
the production of snow from treated sewage effluent does neither of these things so therefore 
does not constitute a substantial burden.   
 On the surface of Judge Bea’s argument a substantial burden only exists when the 
government either coerces with the threat of sanctions or if the government withholds a benefit 
based upon an individual’s religious beliefs.  A burden can exist on “subjective, spiritual 
experience” as long as the government is not coercing, through the threat of criminal sanction or 
government benefit, the individual to act contrary to their religious beliefs.  Through these two 
cases, the court argued a preconstructed definition of religion, a definition of religion consistent 
with a particular body ontology perpetuated through the history and mythology of secular 
liberalism.  What becomes apparent through the majority’s reliance on Yoder and Sherbert to 
define a ‘substantial burden’ is a particular construction of legitimate religion.   In essence, a 
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subjective spiritual experience is not part of, or protected as a legitimate religious practice.
86
  Is 
the court’s protection of a legitimate religious practice the very act of defining that which 
constitutes ‘true’ religion?  By deciding what is defined as protectable religious practice the court 
is perpetuating a colonial violence which has consistently sought to regulate and remove Indians 
as distinct cultural groups. 
 The crux of Justice Bea’s argument is that the use of treated sewage effluent only effects 
the beliefs of the Indian peoples who understand the mountain to be sacred.  The effect upon the 
Indians, he argues, is not actual, not objective, but merely a subjective and emotional burden;  
the only effect of the proposed upgrades is on the Plaintiffs’ subjective, emotional religious 
experience.  That is, the presence of recycled wastewater on the peaks is offensive to the 
Plaintiffs’ religious sensibilities.  To Plaintiffs, it will spiritually desecrate a sacred 
mountain and will decrease the spiritual fulfillment they get from practicing their religion 
on the mountain. Nevertheless, under Supreme Court precedent the diminishment of 
spiritual fulfillment - serious though it may be - is not a “substantial burden” on the free 
exercise of religion.
87
 
This statement is the lynchpin to the majority’s entire judicial opinion.  In line with secular 
liberalist theories for a rational and a-cultural individual, this decision is contingent upon a 
dichotomy between belief and practice, between thought and bodied movement.  The liberation 
of the individual sees the body as second to, and often times adverse to, the freedom of the self 
as expressed and understood through language as both primary and transcendental.
88
  In this 
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understanding, the body moves because the mind both chooses and tells it to.  Hence, the public 
sphere can be a place of pluralist and humanist participation in which the secular comportment of 
the body can exist through choice.  As fundamentally a-cultural beings, we do not have to act in 
accordance with our traditions, cultures, and religions.  In other words, the belief that we are a-
cultural means that our true nature is purely rational and transcendent of culture, and that culture 
is something that we can then have the ability to choose to participate in.  Under an a-cultural 
secular paradigm, religious experience, and especially religious otherness (non-Christian 
religion) is preserved for the private sphere, for a space supposedly outside of government, 
politics, and our right to be religious. The Hopi, the Navajo, or any of the other Indian groups 
fighting for the protection of Humphrey’s Peak are not being fundamentally violated as a-
cultural beings (subjected to religion).  Instead, the burden is upon their subjective spiritual 
experience, something that, regardless of the authenticity, orthodoxy, or community and 
historical continuity of these religious practices is not a substantial burden on religious exercise.  
The violence of an a-cultural secular epistemology is that, while being cultural in its own right, 
wields its idea of its own transcendent superiority to regulate those who are culturally different.  
By elevating the rational mind above the objectified body, the violence of a-cultural secularism 
lies within the American legal body ontology.   
 According to the courts, a ‘diminishment of spiritual fulfillment’ does not violate a free 
exercise of religion?  Under the court’s body ontology, spiritual fulfillment is separate from 
bodied exercise.  The mind has the ability to choose whether or not to move the body in 
accordance with belief.  The a-cultural being has the rational ability to decide to be cultural, 
religious, ethnic, etc.  Following this line of argument, bodied exercise is not contingent upon 
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spiritual fulfillment due to the belief that spiritual fulfillment is transcendent and separate from 
bodied exercise.   
 In order to find how objective religious experience is defined and protected, as opposed 
to the subjective religious experience of the Indian plaintiffs, we must look to the majority’s 
reliance upon Sherbert and Yoder to define a substantial burden.  These two cases are used to set 
a standard of religious burden in which other cases can be tested against.
89
  Since a burden upon 
a ‘subjective spiritual experience’ does not constitute a substantial burden under RFRA 
something must be replaced which could be recognized as a substantial (and objective) burden 
upon religious exercise.    
 Religious exercise is not itself protected, instead the ability or the right to choose to 
practice religion is protected.  ‘Exercise’ is understood as the ability to make a decision.  As 
Justice Bea argues, the government cannot coerce you into being religious or into not being 
religious.  The focus here is on the free ability to choose to practice religion.  
 For Judge Bea (speaking for the majority and, arguably, for American law in general), 
religious freedom is a matter of choice.  Talal Asad, in his contemplations on agency and pain, 
points out that “when the word ‘body’ is used, it is more often than not a synonym for the 
individual whose desire and ability to act are taken as unproblematic.”
90
  Asad argues that there 
is a link in secular thought between the body, or what I would like to label as religious exercise, 
and the subject’s ability to make a free and rational decision.  Religious freedom in this 
understanding is located in the individual’s ability to choose to move their body. 
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 This decision demonstrates how fundamentally embedded the American legal body 
ontology is in religious freedom cases.  When the court isolates a substantial burden it operates 
on an ontology which places the body secondary to the actor’s ability to construct herself.  
“Religious sensibilities, subjective, emotional religious experience,” this is Enlightenment 
secularized language which locates and divides religious bodies from religious belief.  This 
language places religious otherness, in particular Native American religions, in opposition to a 
“civilized” and historically Protestant society.  The “savage” practices which incorporate religion 
into their forms of government and public life are antithetical and detrimental to a functioning 
secular democracy.  Peter Fitzpatrick forcefully argues how occidental law, the law of Europe 
and the colonial projects, and American law which developed from and out of these, is built upon 
the dialectic of the savage other, of the colonized Indigenous subject that fundamentally 
represents the antithesis to progress and the modern liberal state.  He writes that “the colonized 
are relegated to a timeless past without a dynamic, to a ‘stage’ of progression from which they 
are at best remotely redeemable and only if they are brought into history by the active principle 
embodied in the European.  It was in the application of this principle that the European created 
the native and the native law and custom against which its own identity and law continued to be 
created.”
91
  The disconnect between religion as consisting of “sensibilities” or “subjective, 
emotional” experiences and religion as real, bodied, and lived is a gap only crossable by a body 
ontology which allows for a private and secular religion.  Private and secular religion is protected 
as the objective and real religion in which the “subjective, emotional” religions of the Native 
Americans stand as antithesis to.  Indian religions are situated as antithetical to free religion due 
to the persistence of the American legal body ontology that frames practice as separate from 
belief, and the secular public sphere as distinct from the religious private sphere.  The traditions 
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and religions of the Native Americans are perpetuated as the constant savage other to be 
conquered and assimilated precisely because they so commonly fall outside of the paradigmatic 
norms for what constitutes acceptable religious practice according to the United States 
construction of ‘free’ religion.  
 According to the majority opinion, religious actions are recognized as protectable only if 
the government threatens an individual’s right to free exercise by denying the individual the 
ability to choose whether or not they can practice their religion.  With this, the secular separation 
of belief and body becomes the central trope of a liberated subject in which the “subjective 
spiritual experiences,” exemplified in the legal discourse by Native American religion, is 
understood as antithetical to the free exercise of religion.  This reduces and isolates the religious 
to a perspective, to a performance in which religion is something that exists outside of and prior 
to experience, to movement.  Furthermore this ruling opens the door for regulatory action (as 
certainly this case is) towards religious practices that operate on fundamentally different 
embodied epistemologies.  According to the court, the Hopi tribal member can still choose 
whether or not to practice their religion because there does not exist a direct burden, or effect, 
upon that person’s ability to choose to practice their religion.   Once again we find the 
perpetuation of colonial violence through the legally justifiable regulation of Indian religion. 
 The dissent constructs a definition of religion (and a substantial burden) that is 
categorically and ontologically the same as the majority’s, yet comes to a completely different 
decision.  The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, argues that the use of treated sewage effluent 
for snow production creates a substantial burden upon the Indians’ free exercise of religion and 
furthermore, the state does not have a compelling interest in creating this burden.  In service of 
his argument, Justice Stevens claims that “the majority misunderstands the nature of religious 
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belief and practice,” and has therefore wrongly defined and applied substantial burden in this 
case.
92
  What is interesting is that the American legal body ontology underlying the majority’s 
opinion is also present within the dissent.  This American legal body ontology endures because it 
is the binding mechanism, the core ontology behind which the legal construction of religious 
freedom exists.  Because the American legal body ontology is at work within the dissent, their 
argument retains a measure of colonial force in that they remain incapable of understanding and 
arguing for the protection of Hopi religion from a position which values Hopi religion and 
philosophy from its own place of authority.  By saying that religion is essentially subjective 
practice the dissent is still saying that Hopi religion is subjective, and therefore remains a means 
of colonial regulation.     
 Both the majority and the dissent argue from the same “nature of religious belief and 
practice.”  The difference lies in the application of this definitional ontology and is testament to 
its pervasiveness and impassable boundaries.  The free exercise of religion means that the body 
is moved because of belief.  This is the inescapable ontology of the court.  Instead of 
understanding religious exercise to be prior to or co-existent with spiritual fulfillment, Justice 
Stevens perpetuates the body ontology of the court by emphasizing that “religious exercise 
invariably, and centrally, involves a ‘subjective spiritual experience.’”
93
  For Justice Stevens, 
religious exercise can be a subjective spiritual experience.  Justice Stevens recognizes that the 
majority’s main argument lies within the use and the application of a substantial burden as a 
definitional action which focuses the question of free exercise upon the action of the government 
to either deny an individual the right to practice their religion or benefit a particular type of 
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religious action.
94
  In the same vein as the court’s body ontology, Justice Stevens defines religion 
as a belief that exists prior to physical embodied experience.  He writes: 
Religious belief concerns the human spirit and religious faith, not physical harm and 
scientific fact.  Religious exercise sometimes involves physical things, but the physical or 
scientific character of these things is secondary to their spiritual and religious meaning.  
The centerpiece of religious belief and exercise is the “subjective” and the “spiritual.”  As 
William James wrote, religion may be defined as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of 
individual men [and women] in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to 
stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.
95
 
Justice Stevens is not arguing that there exists an objective religious burden.  Since the physical 
comes second to the religious, Justice Stevens finds that a true substantial burden is that which 
necessarily affects the subjective spiritual experience.  Where the dissent diverges from the 
majority’s use of the body ontology is in the implied causality of the body from belief.  Where 
the majority finds that a burden upon subjective spiritual experience has no real objective 
(physical, embodied) effect, Justice Stevens believes that a burden upon a subjective spiritual 
experience will have an effect upon the physical and embodied religious exercise.  Although this 
sort of belief/body causality is different than the belief/body framework employed through the 
majority’s opinion, both rely on an ontology of the body that places belief and discourse prior to 
bodied movement.  Whereas they arise from the same ontological roots, the differing 
constructions of the relationship between belief and body represent a double and alternating 
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definitional attempt which can be found within the greater American mythology of religion.  The 
majority opinion, written by Justice Bea, represents a dominant stream in American secular 
liberalism that understands the subject to be a fundamentally a-cultural and potentially rational 
being who has the agency, the rational and conscious ability, to choose whether or not to exercise 
their religious beliefs.  This is a manifestation of the American legal body ontology that separates 
the body from belief into a non-causal, agentive relationship.   
 The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, represents a persistent stream of thought that I 
would like to argue has become increasingly more prevalent in the academic study of religion as 
well as the academy at large.  Through an analysis of the dissent I wish to demonstrate the 
prevalence of the court’s body ontology within a greater academic culture which seeks to 
understand the relationship between moving bodies and discourse.  Following Derrida on the 
function of an aporia, we can see how the impassable boundary, the non-deconstructable 
contradiction of religious freedom is such that anyone participating in this discourse within the 
American legal and academic culture at large has yet to really move beyond it.  The dissent 
imagines bodied movement as secondary and causally related to belief.  This relationship places 
belief as the primary religious reality in that it is symbolic, discursive, believed, and imagined.   
 Judith Butler would argue that the constructivist causality of Justice Stevens’ dissent can 
be understood “to be a kind of manipulable artifice, a conception that not only presupposes a 
subject, but rehabilitates precisely the voluntarist subject of humanism that constructivism has, 
on occasion, sought to put into question.”
96
  Although Justice Stevens is not a self-proclaimed 
constructivist, his argument none-the-less falls under similar paradigms.  The argument that the 
body arises from belief creates a believing subject that is separate (and transcendent to) their 
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body.  Butler collapses the causality to a single co-determinant and co-constructive act in which 
the performance of the subject is that which constitutes the identity/materiality of that subject.  
Butler explains that  
“the body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or signified as prior. This 
signification produces as an effect of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless 
and simultaneously claims to discover as that which precedes its own action.  If the body 
signified as prior to signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or 
representational status of language, which claims that signs follow bodies as their 
necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all.  On the contrary, it is productive, constitutive, 
one might even argue performative, inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours 
the body that it then claims to find prior to any and all signification.”
97
 
The performative act is a simultaneous constitutive act in which the body is signified, is 
‘materialized’ through the signification.  The actual materiality of the body is never separate 
from its signification, and as performative, is always mediated and materialized through the 
signification.  The speech act, introduced through the work of J. Austin and famously 
encountered by Derrida is politicized and advanced as a constitutive performativity by Butler.  
As I read Butler, performativity is the process, the moment, in which the sign, discourse, or what 
I would like to translate as ‘belief’ is brought into existence through the act of performing that 
belief.  Belief is co-determinous with the performative act.  In this sense, the belief, constituted 
through language by the speech act, is the only accessible body; it is the materiality of the body. 
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 Butler understands the performative to be situated and limited by a small range of 
possible roles.
98
 Influenced by Foucault, Butler understands that the success of performativity is 
“not because an intention successfully governs the action of a speech, but only because that 
action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or 
citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices.”
99
 Power and the structures that constitute a 
tradition or cultural milieu are perpetuated by their repeated performance to the point where they 
become the most viable modes of performance within a particular group.  This way, power is 
constantly materialized through its performativity.   
 Where exactly is the body?  Butler’s reliance on discourse and the construction of the 
subject through the performance of the discursive is representative of a body ontology that 
cannot imagine the materiality of the body, the bodied movement of living beings, as prior to or 
constitutive of the discursive.  For Butler, the body is not erased nor is it understood as a causal 
response to a belief or thought, instead the body is always mediated by the sign as the sight for 
the performance and the citation of the sign.  The body is absorbed by the sign as the sign.  There 
does not exist a very great divide between Justice Steven’s understanding of the relationship 
between belief and body and Butler’s sign as body/body as sign.  A Butlerian deconstruction of 
the dissent would, I imagine, reconfigure the substantial burden to be upon the viability of the 
religious act, that the use of treated sewage effluent would effectively work to reconstruct the 
religious performance because the very nature of the burden falls upon the validity of the sign.   
The possibility of the type of performance, the type of bodied movement, is dependent upon the 
viable discursive options constituting the range of performances.  This operates on a body 
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ontology that, like Justice Bea and Justice Stevens, understands the body, the objective 
physicality of bodied movement, to be secondary to and causally connected to belief.   
 Justice Stevens’ dissent is not that radical or out of place.  The dissent tends to see ‘lived 
tradition’ as the embodied performance of a belief system.  Once again the American legal body 
ontology appears.  How often, and for how long has the study of religion operated under these 
same assumptions?  This body ontology, as represented through both the majority opinion and 
the dissent is endemic to an understanding of the relationship between belief and religious 
exercise.  Butler’s theory of performativity, in many ways, follows the same colonial paradigm 
as  Justice Stevens.  The problem within these theoretical or judicial iterations of performativity 
is that racial difference, and particularly, bodied racial difference is silenced.  Robert Warrior, 
commenting on the erotic poetry of Joy Harjo, argues that a just theory about bodies cannot be 
separate from the living bodies of American Indians.  He writes, “Harjo speaks of ‘thinking in 
skin and our pleasure’ as she declares, ‘there is something quite compelling / about this skin 
we’re in.’  For Harjo, then, our bodies - or our skins, which are the parts of us that most 
immediately touch and relate to the rest of the world around us - are not only the most immediate 
site of the battle for our selves, but also the primary guide to where we ought to be headed.  Our 
skin, as Harjo puts it, is the map.”
100
  From Warrior’s perspective then, a Butlerian 
performativity is only performative for those culturally unmarked bodies.  The bodied difference 
of American Indians is both the site for which power and performance are employed as 
regulative of identity, as well as the site for which American Indians can reclaim their identities 
in ways resistant to an American legal body ontology - an ontology which will always attempt to 
elevate a transcendental a-cultural individualism over an objectified and machine like body. 
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Chapter IV 
 Religious-Freedom as Movement Ontogenesis 
  
 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act defines an exercise of religion as “any exercise 
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”
101
 The 
language of religious freedom presupposes, and sets forth the myth that lived religious 
experience, the bodied movements of religious actors, arises from belief.  In religious freedom 
cases the courts must decide whether or not an action under question results from a sincerely 
held religious belief.  Once the court has decided whether or not an action is religious, they must 
then ask whether or not the government has caused a “substantial burden” on that religious 
exercise.     
 In an interesting twist of regulatory power, the definitional burden switches from the 
claim of religious authenticity to the question of whether or not the exercise is important enough 
to constitute an exemption.  In other words, since (or if) the court cannot tell someone whether or 
not they are practicing their religion, or that they believe it sincerely, the court must decide if that 
action is religious enough to constitute an exemption from a governmental burden.  This is a 
definitional exercise in which the boundaries of religion, drawn around what is religious enough, 
regulate religious practice.   
 Religion is a category constructed from and within the European and American history of 
secularization, imperialism, and colonization.  Talal Asad, among others, has presented 
substantial evidence that religion, as understood in Euro-American secular society, as well as 
championed and explored within the academy, is largely a product of a specific Christian 
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history.
102
  The study of religion, along with the increased secularization of society and the state 
regulation of institutionalized formal religious power, has come to define religion primarily as a 
set of symbolic meanings within a greater order, which is itself distinguishable from other 
categories of study, such as culture or law.
103
  In turn, Asad argues that this particular 
historicization has come to understand the religious as invested within and by the individual.
104
 
 Through her critical analysis of American liberalism, Wendy Brown examines the 
dominant epistemology which structures religion and culture as bound and located within the 
individual.  She challenges the liberal assumptions of governmentality and politicization as being 
primarily a-cultural.  American liberalism, she writes, has championed certain claims to 
universal truth and has, in light of its pluralist democratic structure, positioned these truths above 
and behind the various subjective truth claims proposed by the many and differing politically 
represented groups.
105
  It is because American liberalism as governmentality (and scholarship) 
proclaims itself as a-cultural is it capable of claiming superiority above and beyond the ‘cultural’ 
truth claims of its subjects.   
 Brown defines three reasons for the appearance and belief that American liberalism is a-
cultural and superior.  First she argues that liberalism’s claim to universal truth makes political 
power not a matter of culture, since it is outside all cultures.
106
  Secondly, the notion of 
individual freedom supports the conceit that individuals can be apart from culture, that they can, 
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with the right governmentality, stand without culture.
107
  Thirdly, and most importantly, 
“liberalism presumes to master culture by privatizing it and individualizing it, just as it privatizes 
and individualizes religion.  It is a basic premise of liberal secularism and liberal universalism 
that neither culture nor religion are permitted to govern publicly; both are tolerated on the 
condition that they are privately and individually enjoyed.”
108
  They are believed to be privately 
and individually enjoyed because the religious or cultural body is subject to the unfettered free-
will of the individual. 
 Robert Wolff argues that the existence of an a-cultural epistemology behind American 
liberalism can be seen as a result of the pluralist necessity for a transcultural, non group affiliated 
governmentality.  He writes that for the majority, culture, religion, and group identity come to be 
seen as a “social inheritance ... to be cast off, a spell from which we must be awakened.” 
109
  For 
the population majority that is not marked by an alternative cultural or religious affiliation the 
individual is no longer seen as a cultural being, but an individual free from the influence of 
culture.  Because the individual (predominantly, the white male) can choose whether or not to be 
affiliated with a cultural group, and can choose whether or not to socially live the practices of 
that cultural or religious group, then the false belief that the individual is somehow beyond or 
fundamentally and purely without culture is advanced.  In one sense, religion is reduced to its 
performativity.  Brown explains that “in liberalism, the individual is understood to have, or have 
access to, culture or religious belief; culture or religious belief does not have him or her.  The 
difference turns on which entity is imagined as governing in each case: sovereign individuals in 
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liberal regimes, culture and religion in fundamentalist ones.  At the same time, liberal legalism 
and the liberal state are identified as fully autonomous of culture and religion.”
110
  The American 
Indian who resides in a political economy where the line between the religious and the political 
is necessarily blurred is often the subject for which the forces of liberal legalism attempt to 
control through their very insistence on their own transcendental autonomy.  The aim of those 
wielding the force of liberal legalism is to ‘free’ those members of the human race who they 
imagine to be repressed by the religious and cultural forces in which they interact.  This is a 
colonial conceit, one which privileges a particular type of colonial governmentality by its very 
promise of a rational and a-cultural justice. 
 Since the individual is considered the site of cultural or a-cultural agency, that is, if the 
individual has the ability to choose whether or not to act on their beliefs, to exercise their beliefs 
in the public sphere then, as Justice Bea understood it, regulating the exercise of religion does 
not necessarily amount to a burden on the practitioner's religion.  Why?  When religion amounts 
to a choice of individual preference, or “perspective,” religious experience is divided into 
precariously connected subjective and objective realms.  When the body does not have to 
exercise belief an improper act of individual will can be regulated. 
 American jurisprudence places the individual as the sole bearer of rights.  Furthermore, 
the very notion of a peoplehood, of a collective American identity, and the nationalist discourses 
of freedom are based in the belief that our fundamental freedoms are realized through the legal 
protection of individual rights.
111
  Legal scholar Peter Fitzpatrick locates the rise of the 
individual as the great recipient of rights, as the source of all rights (for some, namely those with 
power) as outlined through the myth of progress.  He writes, “there is an integral connection 
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between the specific Western construction of reality as unitary, exclusive and objectively 
knowable and the construction of the individual as the pre-social, the ultimate and sufficient site 
of knowing and acting on that reality.  The subject is invested with a capacity to know 
universally, a capacity responsive to universal forms of reality.”
112
  The progress of civilization, 
he argues, was (and is) imagined to require a freeing of the individual from the bonds and 
structures of savage society.  The colonial concept of ‘savage society’ in North America has 
often been constructed based upon the different American Indian societies that the colonists 
encountered.  Fitzpatrick explains that “law, like social solidarity, is seen in terms of an 
evolution from one polar position to another.  The origin of law is located in mechanical 
solidarity where, among ‘the lower forms of society’, it is penal, repressive and religious; its 
culmination is found in organic solidarity where law is based on co-operation among individuals, 
its sanctions are ‘purely restitutory’, its rules tend to be ‘universalized’ and rational, and where 
(quoting Durkheim) ‘it is no longer wrath which governs repression, but ... foresight’.”
113
  The 
belief is that the individual can be autonomous from the repressive nature of religion and 
therefore it is the duty and reason of individual rights that the citizen is able to free himself from 
the ‘primitive’ repression of religion and culture.   
 The individual is both simultaneously capable of being free from religion while being 
able to freely believe a religion of their choice.  Winnifred Sullivan explains that religious 
authority has been relocated within the individual instead of within the community.  She explains 
how the “precondition for political participation by religion increasingly became cooperation 
with liberal theories and forms of governance.  As a result, the modern religio-political 
arrangement has been largely, although not exclusively, indebted ... to protestant reflection and 
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culture.”
114
 This has resulted in an understanding of religion, or “true religion, some would say - 
on this modern protestant reading, to be understood as private, voluntary, individual, textual, and 
believed ...” so that “crudely speaking, it is ... modern protestant (religion) - that is free.”
115
 
 If the individual is expected to progress beyond religion and culture and participate 
(publicly?) in a secular civilized society, then the important question must be asked; what does 
secular society expect and demand of public religious bodies and bodied movement?  In other 
words, which forms of religious exercise are protected by law and constitutional right?  It would 
seem antithetical that any religious exercise would be protected under the first amendment, if 
that amendment was, in many ways, a way to liberate the individual from the believed repression 
that religion and culture have created.   
 Religious freedom is aporia.  That is, the concept (the promise?) of religious freedom 
cannot be deconstructed; it poses an impassable limit, a horizon that can be neither approached, 
nor passed beyond.  Certainly we can trace genealogies of religious freedom, we can find 
histories and uses of the subject, we can gesture to its natal genesis, but the concept itself exists 
in its own contradiction.  As aporia, religious freedom in our democratic society cannot be 
discarded as an effect of its promise and accountability.  Therefore, as elemental and aporetic, 
our discussions on religion and politics are always irreducible to religious freedom.  In comes the 
logic of the secular.  In comes the unabashed regulation of Indian religion.  The idea of the a-
cultural individual, the secular in all its might, is dependent for its very existence upon the aporia 
of religious freedom.  Without the divide of religion and self, religion and politics, individual and 
cultural, mind and body, there could not exist a theory of the secular at all.   
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 Despite the impassability of religious freedom, perhaps we may arrive upon the aporetic 
threshold as exorcists and as architects.  For as much as an effect of spectrality can perpetuate an 
aporia, a regular and persistent presence of the American legal body ontology haunts religious 
freedom within the history of federal Indian law.  Religious freedom depends upon the constant 
re-appearing and employment of the American legal body ontology.  The freedom of religion, or 
the freedom from religion relies on the idea that the mind is separate from the body.   And so 
with religious freedom we find the constant, yet ghost like presence of a particular body 
ontology. 
116
  This presence is important to recognize precisely because of the relationship 
between religious freedom and the American legal body ontology.  As an exorcist, can we 
attempt to drive this specter, this ghostly haunting, from the aporia of religious freedom? 
 To the extent that the relationship between religious freedom and the American legal 
body ontology can be imagined as a place of spectrality, or as Ananda Abeysekra has called such 
places, “ghostly locations,” we must recognize that such places exist as the virtual landscapes of 
colonialism.  Abeysekera suggests that spectrality is deeply connected to the construction of an 
other.  He writes that “if the ghostly, disjunctured present is the very possibility of the other, it is 
also the im-possibility of justice beyond law.  In other words, ordinary notions of justice that is 
possible here and now does not help us think about those others who are dead, who are no longer 
present, who are victims of imperialisms, totalitarianisms, or other racist colonial 
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exterminations.”
117
  Our present notions of justice, the justice of cases like Navajo Nation v. 
USFS, effectively works to silence American Indian difference.  The specter of the American 
legal body ontology haunts our legal notions of difference and perpetuates forces of colonial 
power.   
 Reading this discussion of spectral hauntings and colonial exorcisms into Danika Medak-
Saltzman’s discussion of transnational Indigenous experience, it becomes apparent how the 
presence of colonial specters reinforces the dominant forms of colonial power over the 
possibilities for defining and constructing Indigeneity.  She writes how “textual laments that 
allow readers and scholars alike to be comfortable with dismissing the importance of Indigenous 
experiences effectively reinscribe the ‘vanishing Native’ archetype that still plagues 
contemporary representations of Native peoples.”
118
 The force of the American legal body 
ontology is a force of constant reinscription of a colonial ontology upon Native systems of 
governance, culture, and religion.  As we have seen in Navajo Nation v. USFS, this reinscription 
takes place through the force of law. 
 To re-imagine religious freedom without its colonial specters is to counter the very 
presence of aporia itself.  If we cannot do without aporia, perhaps we can do away with its 
ghosts.  What would religious freedom be like without the presence of the American legal body 
ontology?  Would religious freedom continue to exist as a permissible category of human rights 
and governmentality?   
 The problem seems to be in the supposed notion that an aporia is a wall, a horizon, an 
impassable limit.  Catherine Keller has suggested otherwise in her essay “The Cloud of the 
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Impossible: Embodiment and Apophasis.”  She argues that it is in the moment of the movement 
between the coincidental opposites, between an unsaying of the body and the materiality of the 
body itself where the aporia turns to porosity, to a cloud of impossibility.
119
  At this moment, 
passage through the aporia is possible.  
 At the heart of the contradiction of religious freedom is the problem posed by the specter 
of the body ontology.  What of the materiality of the body?  What exactly is the relationship 
between the body and sign, between movement and belief, performance and culture?  In order to 
exorcise this body ontology from religious freedom, in order to pass into the cloud of 
impossibility, we must first attempt to encounter this contradiction, perhaps to dwell within it as 
the ever in-between, as the dance, the play, the flesh.   
 In his essay, The Concept of Nature, I, Maurice Merleau-Ponty addresses the inherent 
problem with a Cartesian idea of nature, one which dictates a dialectic of man and nature.  
Nature, understood as the primordial ground of being, (not as an ecologic totality opposed to city 
or civilization), cannot be understood to exist apart from man.  Nature, he argues, “presents itself 
always as already there before us, and yet as new before our gaze,” and so only exists in any 
continuity or totality sui generis because of reflective thought.
120
  If this is the case, then when 
consciousness is removed from nature, nature will cease to exist at all, except as a condition of 
our experience.  But, if nature is understood to engender itself, that is, exist regardless of human 
reflection, “then we must recognize that primordial being which is not yet the subject-being nor 
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the object being ... in every respect baffles reflection.”
121
  Reflection upon nature would be a 
constant illusion, which would be to say, that reflection is impossible.  Neither can nature be 
thought of as “being engendered by another, which would reduce it to the condition of a product 
and a dead result.” 
122
 Nature, understood as a causal product of creation, would remove its status 
as primordial being.  This is not viable either, for nature is primordial being because everything 
exists within nature.  Any philosophical approach which separates man from nature is bound to 
enter into this conundrum, this problem.   
 Merleau-Ponty resolves this conflict and replaces man within nature by recognizing that 
“the solipsistic object of perception can only become pure object on the condition that my body 
enters into systematic relations with other animate bodies.”
123
  The body as the acting vehicle of 
perception exists within a nature that it helps constitute, a nature that it touches and feels to exist, 
and a nature that it cannot separate itself from.  No longer can there exist human and nature as 
something separate, because a real continuity of relationships would negate the existence of any 
dualism.  Within a realm of systematic relations, in a world of constant continuity, all parts are 
dependent upon all other parts and exist only in relation to each other.  Merleau-Ponty argues for 
the primacy of perception as proof for this continuity.  Conceptual thought is built from 
physical/sensational experience, and the world - nature - is experienced to exist through our 
perception of it.  And nature, as we perceive it, is “pregnant with its form,” that is, it reveals 
itself as real only as a synthesis of relational animate objects or beings meaningfully constructed 
by our perception.  This “synthesis which constitutes the unity of the perceived objects and 
which gives meaning to the perceptual data is not an intellectual synthesis ... it is rather a totality 
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open to a horizon of an indefinite number of perspectival views which blend with one another 
according to a given style, which defines the objects in question.”
124
   
 The primacy of perception offers evidence that, although we experience a self in a body 
and a world outside of ourselves, the self and nature are not bounded totalities but exist in a fluid 
and dynamic relationship with each other.  Merleau-Ponty calls this continuity of existence 
‘Flesh’.  Instead of a world and a body, “there is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in 
the other ...” and “flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance ...” but exists “midway 
between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a 
style of being wherever there is a fragment of being.  The flesh is in this sense an element of 
Being.”
125
  Flesh is the interrelation of existence that gives rise to substance.  To understand 
religious freedom without its body ontology, that is, without constantly and inevitably separating 
man from nature, mind from body, subject from object is to re-understand the aporia as flesh.  In 
this light, nature exists as the in-between, as relation itself; for if there is no real split between 
man and nature, subject and object, then boundaries are dynamic and dependent upon the 
intertwining.   
 Interrelation is a concept of movement.  Flesh moves.  Flesh is movement.  Brian 
Massumi writes that “this movement-slip gives new urgency to questions of ontology, of 
ontological difference, inextricably linked to concepts of potential and process and, by extension, 
event - in a way bumps ‘being’ straight into becoming.”
126
    Massumi has labeled this extension 
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of becoming ‘ontogenesis.’   Within the cloud of the impossible, broaching upon the aporetic, 
flesh moves ontogenetically, where the relationality of contradictions folds the experience of self 
into the sign as a constant state of emergence.  This movement of movement is dance.  Dance is 
the movement ontogenesis.  The sign, the subject, the body, are all whirled together in infinite 
reversibility, dancing through the aporia in a state of constant becoming.   
 Religious exercise, like dance, is ontogenetic.  There is no longer an exercise of religion.  
Instead, religion embodied in the reversibility of the sign and signifier is a ‘becoming,’ itself 
never separate from movement.  Religious freedom without the specter of the American legal 
body ontology is religious freedom in a movement ontogenesis.  If we were to read this back into 
Navajo Nation v. USFS, religious-freedom resembles the right to sovereignty where the Hopi 
people, “like all peoples, have the right to describe their experiences and claim them as their 
own.”
127
   
 As is evident in the construction and enforcement of our current legal definition of 
religious freedom, any definition of religion that continues to maintain an ontological disjuncture 
inherent within an exercise of religion will only perpetuate our obsession with the primacy of 
discourse and belief.  As is the case with the 9th circuit’s misperception of Hopi religion, 
definitions of religion that rely on body ontologies force the religious into inadequate categories 
of permissibility.  If we can begin to re-theorize and judicially encode religion from a movement 
ontogenesis, then perhaps we can begin to radically redefine religion based upon the play and the 
relation of movement as cultural, religious, and bodied.   
                                            
127
 Craig S. Womack, “Theorizing American Indian Experience,” in Reasoning Together: The Native Critics 
Collective, ed. Janice Acoose, Craig S. Womack, Daniel Heath Justice, Christopher B. Teuton, et. al. (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 384. 
Richards 
 64 
 As Vine Deloria, Jr. has pointed out, “the nature of tribal religions brings contemporary 
America a new kind of legal problem.  Religious freedom has existed as a matter of course in 
American only when religion has been conceived as a set of objective beliefs ... so far in 
American history religious freedom has not involved the consecration and setting aside of lands 
for religious purposes or allowing sincere but highly divergent behavior by individuals and 
groups.”
128
  The protection of Native American sacred place as a religious freedom would 
require a new conceptualization of public property in American law.  This new conceptualization 
would have to legally encode a jurisprudential understanding of public property from a 
movement ontogenesis, as opposed to an objectified and engendered landscape constructed out 
of the American legal body ontology, thereby recognizing a non-essentialized becoming of 
cultural identities based on the movement of people with landscapes. 
 The problem with law as mediator between government power and the multiple 
possibility of religious claims to religious-freedom still beckons the greasy and oiled slope.  The 
difference is that with the exposure of the myth of secularism and its conceit of a body ontology 
comes the application of an enormous amount of dispersant (hopefully biodegradable), 
converting the slippery slope into a projectable climb.  Areas such as the San Francisco Peaks 
can no longer be understood as places of secular comportment, with its alleged ‘freedoms,’ but a 
place in which the ontogenetic takes precedent, a place in which Hopi religion is absolutely 
burdened by the use of treated sewage effluent precisely because such an action halts 
ontogenesis.   
 Jonathan Z. Smith gave a lecture last year at the University of Colorado entitled, “Now 
you see it, now you won’t: The Future of the Study of Religion over the Next 40 Years.”  During 
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this lecture, Smith self-admittedly played the oracle and suggested areas of study that offer the 
greatest potential for the next generation of scholars of religion.  Smith highlighted the 
importance of a future study that focuses on the body, movement, and gesture.  I do not believe 
this prediction to be an outline of an academic fad, instead I see this prediction as a response to a 
necessity within the field of religious studies.  Unless religious studies, haunted by its own 
specters of a body ontology, wishes to willingly perpetuate the discriminate and inevitably biased 
power play inherent within the present aporia of the body, as action and belief, then those of us 
in the field must seriously exorcise our own ‘bodies’ of the dangerous binaries that haunt us. 
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